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Abstract
This paper shows that di¤erence in equity holding structure leads to heteroge-
neous rm preference for investing in social capital (CSR). In our theoretical model
managerial and customer preferences jointly inuence CSR investments. We show
that if managerial preference is high, social investments of rms are higher, indepen-
dent of customer preference. We test our theoretical predications using data from
Indian rms. We show that rms with concentrated shareholding invest more in
CSR. Firms with dispersed shareholding increase social investments if they export
to the United States and the European Union, but they decrease these expenses in
reaction to antidumping penalties.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about ownership concentration and heterogeneous rm preference for social
investments. Investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) have grown signicantly
over the period 20102013. For example, average CSR spending by US and United King-
dom (UK) companies in the Fortune Global 500 is $15.2 billion a year (Financial Times,
2014). This uptick in CSR spending can be partially attributed to increasing institutional
pressure on rms to be more socially and environmentally responsible. CSR is increas-
ingly becoming an investment criterion. In 2013, socially responsible investments were
estimated to total $6.5 trillion in the US and 237.9 billion euros in the European Union
(EU). Customer preferences also inuence investments in social and environments capital
by business entities, particularly in the developed economies. Yet, such investments of
rms are strategic, and not all rms invest in CSR. If CSR is an investment criterion or
yields nancial returns, we can expect all rms to make such investments.
The nancial case for rms to invest in social capital is not well established. On the
one hand, CSR involves sacricing short-term prot to create social goods, which is likely
to leave rms with a competitive disadvantage (Baumol, 1991). On the other hand, rms
can gain from CSR by earning a better reputation, reducing the threat of regulation and
institutional intervention, and increasing ability to attract high-skilled workers (Turban
and Greening, 1997; Baron, 2001; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000). CSR thus is
implicitly a long-term prot-maximizing tool. Firms can also invest in social capital in
reaction to demands from consumers to engage in delegated philanthropy on their behalf.
If the consumers are endowed with social or environmental preferences, CSR investments
are no di¤erent from prot-maximizing strategies such as advertisement. In such cases,
the rms are likely to pass on the cost of CSR to the consumers. Gary S. Becker suggests
that rms combining the usual prot motive with some social preferences (e.g., CSR) can
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succeed in a competitive environment only if there exist consumers who also have social
preferences.1 In situations where some consumers have social preferences, Besley and
Ghatak (2007) show that two sectors emerge with some rms selling to consumers who
care about CSR and charging a price premium and others selling to neutral consumers
at a lower price. A crucial question is: Why would identical rms [as in the Besley and
Ghatak (2007) model] choose di¤erent levels of investment in CSR? Some papers say that
CSR can be used as an advertising tool (e.g., Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009; Arora
and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Conrad, 2005; Bagnoli and Watts, 2003). Generally, these
papers assume two prot-maximizing rms with similar objective functions choosing their
level of CSR as a way to di¤erentiate their product. All of economic literature assumes
homogeneous rm preferences in public goods provision, even though they account for
heterogeneity in consumer preference. But public goods provision by rms can di¤er with
the willingness of the manager(s) to invest in CSR (Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Adams,
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). CSR can form part of an optimal rm
strategy if managers themselves have social or environmental preferences. Some managers
would be more likely to invest in CSR than others if they have a longer planning horizon
or if they garner private benets from doing so. Either way, little theoretical and empirical
justication indicates that rm preferences for investing in public goods are homogeneous.
This paper is about the heterogeneity in rm preference in the private provision of
public goods. We present a model in which incentives of private rms to invest in CSR
are simultaneously inuenced by rmsand consumerspreferences. We examine the im-
pact of the holding structure of rms on CSR. The di¤erence in investment strategies of
family-owned rms and rms with founderchief executive o¢ cers (CEOs) is well docu-




mented (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). In our model, rms
with concentrated shareholding invest more in CSR compared with widely held rms with
managers having short-term prot targets, irrespective of consumer preferences. The the-
oretical underpinning is that rms investing in CSR can compete as long as shareholders
have a longer planning horizon to account for the time lag in the returns from CSR, which
is the case for rms with an owner-manager and with concentrated shareholding. The con-
trolling stakeholding and the related temporal dimensions of prots ease the participation
constraint of rms with social preferences. This model extends the theoretical literature
on CSR by incorporating heterogeneity in rm preferences. This is consistent with the
Bénabou and Tirole (2010) managerial preference hypothesis. In equilibrium, rms with
concentrated shareholding invest more in CSR compared with rms with dispersed share-
holding, irrespective of consumer preference. Firms with dispersed shareholding invest in
CSR only when the consumers care about CSR.
We empirically verify the predictions of our model using a sample of Indian rms de-
rived from the top ve hundred rms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) for the
period 20062013: 36% of the large rms are a¢ liates of family-owned business groups
with concentrated shareholding and 53% of the rms have dispersed shareholding. Our
sample allows us to compare the investment strategies of rms with di¤erent ownership
structures within the same institutional and legal frameworks. The empirical ndings are
consistent with the theoretical implications; that is, rms with concentrated shareholding
invest more in social capital on average than rms with dispersed shareholding, notwith-
standing consumer preferences. Social and environmental preferences of consumers are
likely to be correlated with demographic characteristics, such as education and technolog-
ical development (Fleishman-Hillard and the National Consumers League, 2007). This,
combined with higher purchasing power of consumers in developed economies, makes it
more likely for them to have higher preferences for CSR compared with consumers in
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developing economies.
These results enhance the traditional view in economics that private rms aim to
maximize wealth and that governments and nonprot institutions are concerned with the
creation of social capital and public goods. Besley and Ghatak (2007) show that CSR can
be Pareto optimal and produce a second-best outcome to government provision. If the
government provision of public goods is imperfect, rms can gain in prots and goodwill
by investing in CSR. Such investments can be in the form of donations to community
infrastructures and sponsorships of social events, or they can be part of the produc-
tion process (renewable energy sources, ethical sourcing, etc.). In an emerging economy
(such as India), the government provision of public goods can often be suboptimal and,
hence, private provision of public goods could be required (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang,
and Wheeler, 2002). At the same time, emerging market rms can export to developed
countries where the consumer preference for CSR is, on average, higher compared with the
domestic market. Therefore, we investigate how exports impact upon CSR investments,
controlling for the ownership structure.
On the one hand, CSR investments are positively associated with exports for both
types of rms, but the association is statistically signicant only for widely held rms.
Firms with concentrated shareholding invest in social capital even when they are not
heavily reliant on export earnings. Probably prompting such action by these rms are their
longer planning horizons, in which the concentrated shareholding partially trades o¤short-
term prot for longer-term returns (legacy e¤ect). On the other hand, CSR investments
of widely held rms are driven by the preference of consumers in the export markets to
invest in responsible business practices (supply-chain e¤ect). These results are robust to
rm- and industry-level heterogeneity, as well as endogeneity in rm characteristics and
CSR investments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the emerging literature on
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CSR and the performance implications of such investments. We also lay out the model
and the main result, which shows that rms with concentrated shareholding invest more
in CSR, relative to rms with dispersed shareholding. Section 3 presents the institutional
background and the data used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 is a discussion on our
methodology and empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We present a duopoly model of di¤erentiated products in which rms have the possibility
to invest in CSR. In our model, rms are identical (i.e., they have the same marginal costs)
except that one rm values CSR investments and the other is purely prot maximizing.
Consumers are ready to pay a higher price to a rm if it invests in CSR. We model the
e¤ect of ownership structure on CSR investments.
2.1 The Environment
Two rms produces a private good and are located at each end of a Hotelling line, with
locations (or goodscharacteristics) x0 = 0 and x1 = 1. The level of the private good is
denoted by qi, i = 0; 1. They face the same constant marginal cost c and charge a price
pi.2 Besides the production of the private good, rms also invest in CSR; the level of
which is i. Also assume that i 2 [0; ].
CSR is a broad term that encompasses a wide range of activities. In general, it is
concerned with private provision of public goods or reduction of negative externalities.
Some CSR investments, such as social and community expenses and environmental and
pollution control expenditures, can involve a large xed cost that does not depend directly
2We assume that rms sell di¤erentiated products because when consumers are not willing to pay for
CSR, rms will be able to invest in CSR only if they are earning a positive prot.
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on the quantity sold by the rm, e.g., providing a safe workplace or making a large
donation to a social cause.3 In that context, i can be interpreted as the share of prots
allocated to CSR investments and the objective function of rm i can be written as:
Ui = (pi   c)qi   i + ii (1)
Where i = (pi   c)qi is the rms prot and i can be interpreted as a measure of
rmspreferences for CSR. We assume that 0 = 0 (rm 0 is pure prot-maximising rm)
and 1 > 1 (rm 1 derives utility from CSR investments and the marginal utility, 1, is
higher than the marginal cost of CSR). Hereafter, rm 0 is the neutral rm and rm 1 is
the socially responsible rm.
There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1, uniformly distributed on the interval
[0; 1]. Consumers buy up to one unit of output from one of the rms. A consumer located
at x pays the price pi, charged by rm i and a transportation cost tjx   xij, where xi is
the location of rm i = 0; 1. This transportation cost can be interpreted in a broader
sense as the disutility of a consumer, located at x 2 [0; 1], to purchase her preferred good
with characteristics xi. In other words, the transportation cost parameter t measures the
strength of personal preferences.
By buying one unit of good from rm i, a consumer of type x 2 [0; 1] derives utility:
Vi(x) = R  tjx  xij   pi + i
Where R is the reservation value, identical for all consumers, and  (the same for all
consumers) is a parameter expressing the consumerslevel of concern about CSR, which
is positive if the consumers care about CSR and zero otherwise.
3In Appendix 1, we also consider the case in which CSR activities involve variable costs and show
the implications in terms of equilibrium prices and quantities.
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Demand functions facing each rm reect the location of the marginal consumer. The
marginal consumer ~x 2 (0; 1) is indi¤erent between the products of the two rms, given
their prices (p0; p1) and their choices of CSR (0; 1): ~x must satisfy V0(~x) = V1(~x). This
implies that ~x is dened by:
~x =
p1   p0 + t+ (0   1)
2t
Consumers located at x < ~x (resp. > ~x) buy the product of rm 0 (resp. rm 1) and
rmsdemand functions are given by:
D0(p0; p1) = q0 =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if p0 > p1 + t+ (0   1)
p1 p0+t+(0 1)
2t
if p1   t+ (0   1)  p0  p1 + t+ (0   1)
1 if p0 < p1   t+ (0   1)
(2)
And
D1(p0; p1) = q1 = 1 D0(p0; p1) (3)
Our model consists of two stages: In the rst stage, the rms simultaneously choose
and commit to their respective CSR policy (i). In the second stage they compete in
prices. At this stage, CSR characteristics are xed and rms maximise their payo¤ (1)
given these characteristics. We solve this model backwards.
Before turning to the general case where  > 0 (i.e. consumers are willing to pay for
CSR), we rst analyse the special case where  = 0 to examine CSR investments where
consumers do not care, and are unwilling to pay for it.
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2.2 Consumers are not willing to pay for CSR ( = 0)
In stage 2, given (0; 1), each rm chooses its price pi in order to maximise its objective
function (1). Note that as consumers do not care about CSR ( = 0 in equations (2) and
(3)) and the objective function (1) is separable in i and pi, this amounts to choosing the
price pi that maximises the rms prot i = (pi   c)qi.
At the equilibrium in stage 2, pi = t+c with qi = 1=2. Maximizing prots are identical
for both rms and given by t=2. Given this maximum level of prot, rms choose their
level of CSR in stage 1.
The optimal level of CSR will be 0 = 0 for the neutral rm and 1 = minf; t=2g for
the socially responsible rm.
2.3 Consumers are willing to pay for CSR ( > 0)
Now assume that consumers are willing to pay for CSR where the intensity of their
valuations of CSR is given by  > 0. In stage 2, rms objective functions are given by
(1). Lets rst assume that both rms have positive demands (i.e. interior solution). The
objective functions can be rewritten as:








Where i denotes prots for i = 0; 1. First order conditions for p0 and p1 imply that:









This will be the equilibrium in stage 2 if the conditions for an interior solution are
satised: 0  qi  1 for both rms, or equivalently
 3t

 (1   0)  3t

(4)
The di¤erence in terms of CSR is between the limits dened above. Consumers care
about CSR and, if one rm chooses to spend a lot on social causes, all consumers will
prefer to buy from this rm even if they are located far away from it. We have two
potential corner solutions.
First, if (1 0) > 3t , the level of CSR chosen by rm 1 is higher than the level chosen
by rm 0. As a consequence, all consumers buy from rm 1 (i.e. q1 = 1 and q0 = 0).
Prices are given by p0 = c and p1 = c  t+ (1  0). The case in which (1  0) <  3t
is completely symmetric.








  0 if  3t  (1   0)  3t









+ (1   1)1 if  3t  (1   0)  3t
(1   0)  t+ (1   1)1 if 1   0 > 3t
(6)
Firms will maximise these objective functions subject to the constraint that their CSR










 (i   j)  3t
(i   j)  t if i   j > 3t
U0(0; 1) and U1(0; 1) are both convex functions. Moreover, U1(0; 1) is increasing
in 1 for all levels of CSR chosen by rm 0. This is due to the fact that rm 1 enjoys
some utility from CSR investments (i.e. 1 > 1) Therefore, the best response of rm 1 is
to choose the maximum level of CSR that is a¤ordable. By contrast, depending on the
level of investment chosen by rm 1, U0(0; 1) may be decreasing in 0 for some levels
of CSR. As a consequence, the optimal investment decision of rm 0 is either (i) not to
invest in CSR, 0 = 0 or (ii) to choose the maximum level of CSR that is a¤ordable
To solve for the equilibrium in stage 1, we will rst assume that   3t

. With this
assumption, we are sure to have an interior solution in stage 2, even if one country does
not invest in CSR. We will then analyse potential corner solutions if  > 3t

. Our main
results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition The equilibrium of the two-stage game, in which rms rst choose their
level of investment in CSR and then their pricing strategy is as follows:




g and 2t  
3
  1 > 2
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 or if  > 6 and 3t

<  < t
2
, the
optimal level of CSR in stage 1 is i = 
with equilibrium prices and quantities in stage 2 given by:
pi = t+ c; qi = 1=2
2. In all other cases, the optimal level of CSR in stage 1 is 0 = 0 and 1 given by (7)
11
with equilibrium prices and quantities in stage 2 given by:
p0 = max




































Because U1(0; 1) is increasing in 1 for all levels of CSR chosen by rm 0, the best
response of rm 1 is to choose the maximum level of CSR that is a¤ordable, i.e.
1 =
8><>:



















By contrast, the optimal investment decision of rm 0 is either (i) not to invest in
CSR, 0 = 0 or (ii) to choose the maximum level of CSR that is a¤ordable 0 =  or 
max
0 ,
where max0 is dened in the same way as 
max
1 . The choice between these two strategies
will obviously depend on the utility rm 0 can achieve under each strategy, the level of
which will be determined by the parameters of the model, , t and .
If both rms choose the maximum level of CSR, they will invest the same amount
because prot functions are symmetric. This implies that either both rms choose i = 
or i = t=2 (i.e. their entire prot) and rm 0 gets a utility of:
U0(0; 1) =
8><>: t=2 
 if   t=2
0 if  > t=2
(8)
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On the other hand, if rm 0 does not invest in CSR while rm 1 invests as much as









Where 1 is either  or 
max
1 .
To derive the equilibrium in stage 1, we compare equations (8) and (9). First, if
 > t=2, rm 0 will always choose 0 = 0. Second, for   t=2, rm 0 will invest in CSR
if (8)  (9):














Clearly, as 1  , rm 0 will never invest in CSR if  < 3. This is not the case if






> . We can then
substitute 1 by  in the previous condition and we get that rm 0 will invest in CSR















Note that because U1(0; 1) is increasing in 1 when  3t  (1   0)  3t , a corner
solution in which the optimal levels of CSR would be such that 1 0 <  3t can be ruled
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out. Indeed, if 1   0 <  3t , rm 1 has a prot of 0, which imposes that 1 = 0 and
U1(0; 0) = 0. By choosing any level of CSR such that 1   0 >  3t and the constraint
on CSR expenditures is satised, rm 1 can always get a positive utility. This reasoning
cannot be applied to the other corner solution 1   0 > 3t because, as we have shown
previously, U0(0; 1) is not necessarily increasing in 0.
As in case 1, rm 1 will always choose the maximum level of CSR because U1(0; 1) is
increasing in 1 for all values of 0, while the decision of rm 0 will depend on the values
of the parameters.
If both rms choose to invest in CSR, we have an interior solution and rm 0s utility
is given by (8)). When rm 0 does not invest in CSR, either (i) rm 1 invests  and we
have a corner solution in which rm 0 gets a utility of 0, or (ii) rm 1 invests less than 
(due to the prot constraint) and U0  0 (where U0 is given by (8) if we have an interior
solution or 0 if we have a corner solution.
Note that if  > 6, we have 3t

< t=2 and 1 =  when 0 = 0 (i.e. from (6)
1(0; ) =    t >  ). Therefore the utility of rm 0 is either given by (8) if rm 0
chooses the maximum amount of CSR or U0(0; ) = 0 if rm 0 does not invest in CSR.
The optimal decision of rm 0 is then 0 =  if   t=2 and 0 = 0 if  > t=2.
Finally, if   6, we have that  > 3t

 t=2 and 0 = 0 because whatever 1, U0  0
(while by choosing 0 = , U0 = 0 as shown in (8)).
The rst obvious prediction of the theoretical model is that the socially responsible
rm will always invest a positive amount in CSR, irrespective of consumerswillingness
to pay, and the neutral rm will invest in CSR only if the consumer demand for CSR
is su¢ ciently high (i.e.  is su¢ ciently large). Due to our linear setting, the level of
investment chosen by the socially responsible rm does not depend on the intensity of
rms preferences over CSR (i.e. ). These preferences only determine what is the rm
that will always choose a positive investment in CSR at the equilibrium.
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For a given  > 3, the decision of a neutral rm to invest in CSR depends on  and
t. On the one hand, a large  implies that the socially responsible rm will invest a lot.
In that case, the neutral rm will prefer not to incur the costs of CSR and try to attract
consumers by lowering its prices. On the other hand, when t is low, competition between
rms is very erce because consumers are ready to buy a product that is farther away
from their ideal specication x if the price of this product is relatively low. In that case,
even if the neutral rm does not invest in CSR, it will be easier to attract consumers by
lowering prices.
To conclude, the determinants of CSR investments are not the same for neutral and
socially responsible rms. For socially responsible rms, the only important factor deter-
mining the level of CSR is the level of prot. For the neutral rm, the investment in CSR
is driven by consumerspreferences (i.e. how much they value CSR, beta, relative to low
prices t), and the amount of CSR chosen by the other rm.
Regarding the performance in terms of prots, the socially responsible rm perform
better than the rm with dispersed ownership (q1 > q0 and p1 > p0) when only this rm
invests in CSR. Indeed, consumers are ready to pay for CSR, and as rm 1 is the only rm
investing in CSR, it can charge a higher price but is still able to increase its market share
thanks to its level of CSR. When both rms are identical in terms of their investment in
CSR, they share the market equally.
3 Heterogeneous Preference, Ownership Structure and
CSR
As with the theoretical model, rms with di¤erent objective functions adopt di¤erent
CSR strategies. A socially responsible rm invests in CSR whatever the attitude of the
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consumers regarding corporate giving. A prot-maximizing rm uses CSR as product
positioning when consumers are willing to pay for it. If competition is erce or if the
level of CSR chosen by the socially responsible rm is already very high, the prot-
maximizing rm o¤ers a good that has a lower price but does not invest in CSR (maximum
di¤erentiation in terms of CSR). An important question then is: Why do rms have
heterogeneous preferences for CSR? The literature suggests that the answer could be
related to the rmsownership structure.
Concentrated share ownership, often at the hands of a family, and a¢ liation to business
groups through cross-holdings are common in the industrial organization of the emerg-
ing economies. Firm ownership impacts upon strategic choices, and family rms with
concentrated ownership structure can di¤er from other rms with dispersed ownership in
investment decisions, diversication strategies, and performance. The strategic choices
and nancial outcomes for family rms are well documented (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
As rms with di¤erent ownership structures have heterogeneous strategic choices, they
also have di¤erent views on CSR. Why and how should ownership structure be expected to
impact upon CSR? Social investments of rms can be viewed as a long-term investment,
trading o¤current protability with long-term sustainability. Therefore, rms could plau-
sibly di¤er in their preference for such investments. Firms with concentrated shareholding
could invest more CSR because of stronger long-term incentives for the founding family.
For example, Oh, Chang, and Martynov (2011) argue that, given the limited e¢ ciency of
nancial markets, long-term shareholders are more likely to drive CSR e¤orts in South
Korean rms. However, the controlling shareholder in a family rm can expropriate rent
at the expense of the minority shareholders through CSR investments (Bertrand, Mehta,
and Mullainathan, 2002; Chang, 2003).
Another perspective views CSR as an alternative channel for shareholders to derive
social satisfaction, which is related to Andreoni (1990), who compares di¤erent ways to
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contribute to a social cause and asks whether they are imperfect substitutes. In the case
of CSR, Baron (2007) maintains that if shareholders enjoy some warm-glow e¤ect from
giving to social causes, they have two possibilities to derive social satisfaction: personal
giving or corporate giving, i.e., CSR investments. In that context, a share constitutes a
charity-investment bundle incorporating social and monetary considerations of investors.
Firmsdecisions regarding CSR depend on the substitutability of private and corporate
giving for the shareholders. If the ownership is concentrated or if the rm is owned by a
family, the warm-glow e¤ect derived from CSR by the majority shareholder is very similar
to the warm-glow e¤ect from personal giving. In contrast, corporate giving in dispersed
shareholding rms is only an imperfect substitute of personal giving for individual share-
holders; i.e., it is less obvious that an individual shareholder with a few shares of the rm
derives utility from the CSR investments of the rm.
The di¤erence in rm preferences for CSR can also be inuenced by the incentives of
the manager to invest in social capital. In this case, CSR investments can reect agency
problems (see Baron, 2008), and such managerial incentives are likely to be associated
with rm ownership structure. For example, a family rm with concentrated ownership
can be less a¤ected by agency problems if the managers are themselves part of the family.
Similarly, managers in dispersed shareholding rms are likely to have shorter planning
horizons and tend to underinvest in CSR (Narayanan, 1985). On the contrary, Cespa
and Cestone (2007) nd that CSR investments of rms are positively associated with
managerial entrenchment; i.e., ine¢ cient managers use CSR as an e¤ective entrenchment
strategy to protect their job. Thus, the CSR investment of rms with concentrated
shareholding of a family can be partially driven by the self-interests of the managers.
Therefore, various channels exist through which rm ownership impacts upon rms
preferences over CSR and, thus, on their decisions to invest in such activities. The e¤ect
of rm ownership on social investments remains an open question that lends itself well
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to empirical analysis. Another strand of research suggests that institutional ownership is
positively associated with CSR investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sethi, 2005; Siegl
and Vitaliano, 2007). Institutional shareholders own a signicant proportion of a rms
stocks and cannot sell their shares easily. Therefore, long-termoriented institutional
shareholders are likely to have a longer planning horizon and drive CSR investments
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman, 2002). Foreign investments in rms are is
positively associated with higher CSR investments (Oh, Chang, and Martynov, 2011).
This could be driven by CSR standards in the home country of the importing rms,
stakeholder demands for socially responsible supply chains, and the need to di¤erentiate
in a mature market.
4 Institutional Background and Data
In this section, we present details of the institutional context of our empirical analysis,
discuss the uniqueness of Indian rm ownerships, and describe the data and the key
variables.
4.1 Institutional Background
The institutional framework for corporate governance in India dates back to 1875 with
the establishment of the Bombay Stock Exchange. The Companies Act of 1956 governs
the activities of listed rms in India. Since the liberalization of the economy in 1991,
Indian rms are increasingly reliant on external sources of nance and the role of gov-
ernment has decreased. A shift has taken place away from the traditional interventionist
approach and toward a more Anglo-American style of governance. Similar in spirit to the
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 2001
implemented Clause 49 for all rms listed in the BSE 200 index and subsequently to all
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listed rms. Clause 49 lays down a range of governance imperatives for listed rms, from
board composition, to independence of audit committee, to enhanced disclosure norms.
The dispersed shareholding pattern, as is common in US and UK, is not widely preva-
lent in India so far. About 16% of the rms listed in BSE are wholly or signicantly
controlled by the government (federal and state), and three of the top six Indian rms in
2014 are public sector rms. On the other end of the spectrum, about a third of the listed
rms have Western-style diversied shareholding and professional managers. However,
diversied business groups, mostly having a family-centric controlling stake, dominate
the Indian private sector.
A common characteristic of these business groups is the presence and inuence of
promoters. The term is commonly used to mean controlling stakeholder, which can be an
individual or a family. Promoters collectively hold about 54% of the shares in business
group rms. Consequently, tunneling of assets can be a source of ine¢ ciency and loss of
protability. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) nd that rms with concentrated
shareholding are 30% more likely to su¤er earnings loss during industry shocks compared
with Western-style stand-alone rms in the same industry. Also, rms down the pyramid
are less a¤ected by shocks as their bu¤ered using the assets of the rms nearer the top of
the pyramid. This suggests that the controlling stakeholders benet in business groups
at the expense of minority shareholders. However, Khanna and Palepu (2000) nd that
a¢ liate rms of diversied business groups outperform stand-alone rms in the same
industry.
Although Indian business groups share some characteristics of the pyramidal struc-
tures in Japanese keiretsu, several key di¤erences makes them unique. Similar to keiretsu,
individual rms within an Indian business group are legally separate entities, they are pri-
marily responsible to their own shareholders, and their accounts are audited separately.
However, unlike in keiretsu, in which the a¢ liate rms are connected and coordinated
19
through a common group-specic bank, rms within an Indian business group are coordi-
nated by interlocked boards and by members of the promoter family, similar to the holding
structure of Korean chaebols (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). A typical Indian business group
has dozens of rms with complex cross-holdings. The complexity of cross-holdings makes
computing the conventional cash ow rights and voting rights measures di¢ cult.
Indian industrial organization allows us to compare di¤erent ownership structures
within the same institutional framework and macroeconomic structure. The governance
system there is a combination of dispersed shareholding, such as in the US and the UK,
and an insider-dominated structure, such as in China and Japan. About 32% of the
largest Indian rms are parts of diversied family-owned business groups, 16% are con-
trolled by the state, and about 52% are Anglo-American style rms with dispersed equity
shareholding and outside investors. Moreover, market and non-market institutions in In-
dia have evolved over a long period of time and are relatively stable, allowing for results
that are comparable with extant corporate social responsibility and corporate governance
literature, which is based predominantly on evidence from US and UK rms (Sarkar and
Sarkar, 2000). The presence of stand-alone rms with dispersed shareholding and South
Korean chaebol -type business group a¢ liates with complex cross-holdings within the
same regulatory and accounting framework allows us to overcome many shortcomings of
the cross-sectional comparisons of the rst-generation studies on CSR. In doing so, we





A major challenge to research on corporate governance in emerging economies is avail-
ability of reliable and consistent data. India has a matured capital market and obtaining
information on nancial performance and industry classications is relatively straightfor-
ward. The data are obtained from Prowess, maintained by the Centre for Monitoring
the Indian Economy (CMIE). The sample period is from 2006 to 2013. Although data
on Indian rms are available before that, the coverage and the consistency of the data
are better 2006 onward. For example, Siegel and Choudhury (2012) note that historical
Prowess data had survivor bias, which is corrected for in later years. Moreover, the Indian
Companies Act of 2013 mandates that rms spend on CSR a minimum of 2% of the aver-
age net prot made during the three immediately preceding nancial years. By limiting
our sample period up to 2013, we do not contaminate our results with the enforcement of
this act from April 1, 2014. For every year, we take the top ve hundred listed rms on the
BSE. Collectively, these rms represent over 95% of the total market capitalization. We
follow rms from the time they rst enter BSE 500 within our sample period until the end
of the sample period, even if they drop out of BSE 500 listings. Firms that are delisted,
taken private, or are acquired are eliminated from the sample. We exclude all publicly
owned and foreign-owned rms. These rms lend themselves poorly to comparison in our
context.4 We also exclude rm-year observations with missing data on ownership, as well
as rm performance measures. Our nal sample is an unbalanced panel of 677 rms with
4,143 rm-year observations, although sample sizes vary due to missing observations for
some rms. Table 1 presents the summary statistics on rm and board characteristics
and CSR investments. All monetary values are winsorized at 1% levels and presented in
4For example, CEOs or Managing Directors of public sector rms are xed term bureaucratic appoint-
ments and the pay is contingent on tenure and rank.
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2000 US dollars.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
4.2.2 Ownership Measures
The measurement and classication of shareholding structure of these rms lie at the
heart of our empirical strategy. Prowess provides information to accurately identify the
shareholders who control a rm either directly through their own shareholding, or indi-
rectly through cross-holdings. We create a variable,%Shareholding   Promoters which
combines the direct shareholding by promoters and the proportion of shares held by per-
sons acting in concert with the controlling shareholders. It is a measure of direct and
indirect control of a rm by the promoters. Classifying rms into concentrated and dis-
persed shareholding is an inexact science. A rm is entirely dened neither by a certain
percentage of equity ownership with a particular individual or family nor by the appoint-
ment of a family member as CEO or chairman. We use a threshold concentration of
equity holdings of promoters. If promoters hold 25% or more of the shares outstanding,
we classify the rm as having concentrated shareholding. Whilst this is not a perfect mea-
sure, it is consistent with the measures used in the literature on emerging market nance
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Bertrand, Mehta, Mullainathan, 2002; Siegel and Choudhury,
2012). We also check for the robustness of our classication by using 20%, 30% and 50%
as thresholds.
Of the 677 rms in our sample, 267 (39.44%) have concentrated shareholding and
410 (60.56%) have dispersed shareholding. The rms with concentrated shareholding
often are family-owned or are a¢ liates of business groups. They are also more likely
to have a member of the promoter family as the CEO. Throughout this paper, the top
executive of the rm is identied as the CEO. However, managing directorand chief
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executive o¢ cer are interchangeably used as job titles for the top executive. Prowess
identies the top executive of each rm throughout the sample period but does not provide
information on whether the CEO is a member of the founding family. This information
is hand-collected from various lings (annual reports, statutory lings with the stock
exchange, etc.) of each individual rm. We also control for institutional shareholding by
the percentage of equity shares held by nancial institutions such as mutual funds, banks,
insurance companies, and venture capital funds.
One concern is that rms with concentrated shareholding are structurally di¤erent
from widely held rms. In Table 2, we compare the key variables for rms with di¤erent
ownership structure. Columns 1 and 2 present the mean values of key variables for rms
with concentrated and dispersed shareholding, respectively, and Column 3 reports the
di¤erence in means, with * indicating that the di¤erence is statistically signicant at
conventional levels.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Firms with concentrated share holding are on average larger than widely held rms in
terms of sales revenue and total assets. However, no statistically signicant di¤erence in
performance seems to exist between business group rms with concentrated shareholding
and widely held private stand-alone rms. Also, no statistically signicant di¤erences are
evident in board-level characteristics.
4.2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility
The measure of CSR investments is the natural logarithm of annual spending on CSR
initiatives. Firms report CSR spending to the Securities and Exchange Board of India
along with their nancial lings. CSR investments include spending on building and
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maintenance of public services (parks, primary schools, etc.), expenditures on environ-
mental and pollution controlrelated issues, and donations to a local authority or an
institution for a social or humanitarian cause. Investments in all these categories are re-
ported separately. Thus, we can examine the actual CSR investments and not score-based
KLD-type measures. CSR investment is zero in 38% of the rm-year observations. The
mean CSR investment is $18,450. An average rm spends about 3% of its total sales on
CSR. Further, we use three disaggregated measures of CSR investments: donations to
social causes, investment in social and community infrastructure, and expenses for envi-
ronmental and pollution control.5 Donations form a large part of total CSR spending.
The mean donation is $12,668. The mean for social and community investments is $3,388;
for environmental and pollution control investments, $2,400. From Table 2, rms with
concentrated share ownership seem to invest more in CSR compared with widely held
rms.
However, rms investing in CSR could be di¤erent from rms that do not. In Table 3,
we compare the characteristics of rms for rm-years with and without CSR investments.
Firms that invest in CSR are, on average, bigger in terms of total assets, have higher
prots, have a higher proportion of exports to sales, and have higher shareholding of pro-
moters and institutions. No signicant di¤erence emerges in the size and the proportion
of independent directors on the board. CSR investment seems to be associated with rm
characteristics, thus we need to control for these in our empirical analysis.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
About 30% of concentrated shareholding rm-years and about 40% of dispersed share-
holding rm-years have no CSR investments. The mean CSR investment for rms with
concentrated shareholding is $19,402; for rms with dispersed shareholding, $17,866.6
5Donations do not include donation to election funds or other political donations.
6The di¤erence between the means is statistically signicant at 5% levels.
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Prima facie, the prediction of our model that rms with concentrated shareholding invest
more in CSR is validated. While charitable donations form a large part of CSR spend-
ing for rms with concentrated shareholding (mean of donations is $9,200 compared with
$5,118 and $3,548 for social and community investments and for environmental and pollu-
tion control expenses, respectively), they are spread more evenly for rms with dispersed
shareholding, it is spread more evenly (mean of donations is US$ 18,209 compared to US$
628.40 and US$ 564.70 for social and community investments, and environmental and
pollution control expenses, respectively).
4.2.4 External Environment
In addition to heterogeneity in rmspreferences, we want to investigate the role of het-
erogeneity in consumersbehavior. As seen from Table 1, about 80% of sales revenues
of the sample rms come from the domestic market. We use export revenues (as a per-
centage of sales) to control for the export orientation of a given rm. A rm with higher
export revenues is likely to be more inuenced by consumerspreferences in the coun-
tries they export to. Prima facie, rms with dispersed shareholding have higher export
revenues compared with rms with concentrated shareholding. We use this information
in our empirical analysis to examine how rmspreferences and consumerspreferences
simultaneously impact upon CSR investments.
4.2.5 Control Variables
A range of rm- and board-level characteristics mitigates omitted variable bias. We use
accounting information from stand-alone annual nancial statements reported in Prowess,
cross-checked with information collected from Datastream using a string-matching algo-
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rithm by rmsnames.7 A rms performance is measured by returns on assets (ROA),
and we control for rm size using natural log of sales8. Information on board size and the
number of independent directors is collected from Prowess. Following Clause 49 of SEBI,
the mean proportion of independent directors on the board is expected to be at least 0.5
for all rms.
5 Results
This section discusses the empirical analysis used to examine the theoretical predictions.
We consider the econometric issues and present the results for our baseline models and
robustness tests.
5.1 Ownership Structure and CSR Investments
The central focus of our empirical analysis is the impact on CSR investments of share-
holding structure. We undertake a univariate analysis in which we compare CSR spending
of rms with concentrated shareholding and rms with dispersed shareholding. Because
rms endogenously choose to invest in CSR, one concern could be that rm ownership
and CSR spending are both driven by some unobserved variables. Ideally, we would want
rms to switch between the two ownership structures in response to exogenous factors
and then observe the change in CSR investments. In absence of such counterfactuals,
we address this concern in a number of ways. First, we use a sample of matured rms
for which the ownership structure is historically determined. So, for the sample period,
the ownership structure can be considered exogenously given. Second, in all our speci-
7In cases where the data from the two sources did not match exactly, we keep the nancial data from
Prowess.
8We also check the robustness of our estimates with alternate measures of rm performance (Tobins
Q approximated by MTBV) and rm size (total assets).
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cations we control for rm and board characteristics. Finally, we examine if the CSR
investment of a rm with concentrated ownership at time t would be di¤erent if it was to
switch to dispersed ownership within the same industry at t + 1: To do so, we measure
the di¤erence between the rms actual CSR investment and the imputed value of CSR
as dispersed shareholding entities following the procedures described in Berger and Ofek
(1995, 1996). We calculate the imputed value for a rm i with concentrated ownership by
multiplying the median ratio of annual CSR investment to accounting parameters (assets
or sales), for rms with dispersed shareholding in the same industry, by the i0s level of
the accounting item. The description of the procedure is in Appendix B. The industry
medians are calculated using the narrowest grouping with at least ve rms. The results
are reported in Table 4. The di¤erence between the imputed CSR and the actual CSR
is positive and statistically signicant at 5% levels. This suggests that, for a given rm
i with concentrated ownership, the CSR investment falls if it could switch to being a
dispersed shareholding rm in the same industry. Therefore, it seems that the ownership
structure of rm impacts upon the CSR investments.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Not controlling for any rm-level characteristics, rms with concentrated sharehold-
ing invest more in CSR compared with widely held rms. We further investigate the
di¤erences in corporate governance, rm strategy, and rm performance using multivari-
ate analysis. We regress annual CSR investments on the proportion of shareholding by
promoters and on controls for rm and board characteristics (size, performance, board
size, proportion of independent directors, etc.):
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kTk + it (11)
The dependent variable in Eq. (1) is the natural logarithm of the annual CSR invest-
ment, which is dened as the linear summation of the spending on building and main-
tenance of public services (parks, primary schools, etc.), environmental and pollution
controlrelated expenses, and donations to social or humanitarian causes. All expenses
are audited independently and are expressed in thousands of US dollars.
%Shareholding Promotersit is the percentage share-ownership of the promoter fam-
ily. Xit is a vector of all rm and board characteristics of rm i at time t . To control
for the di¤erence in consumerspreferences, Xit also includes the proportion of exports
in the total sales. PCEOit is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is from
the promoter family. In and Tk are sets of industry and year dummies, respectively. To
further investigate the impact on CSR investments of ownership, we estimate the above
formulation separately on sub-samples of rms with di¤erent ownership structure.9
Table 5 presents the basic results for the impact of rm ownership on rm perfor-
mance. Results are included for ordinary linear regression models with industry and time
dummies and with robust standard errors. Column 1 reports the estimates of the baseline
model with the pooled sample of rms with both types of shareholding. The estimate of
%Shareholding Promotersit is positive and statistically signicant: CSR investments in-
crease with increasing concentration of shareholding. Firms with Promoter CEOs have
no signicant di¤erence in CSR investments compared to rms without a promoter-CEO.
9We do not employ a rm xed e¤ects model because our key variable of interest, %Shareholding  
Promotersit, is a slow-moving variable and rms do not move across the thresholds we discuss in the
previous section.
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These results are consistent with the theoretical proposition that ownership structure is
a source of heterogeneity in rm preference for investing in social capital.
We investigate the determinants of CSR investment for rms with concentrated share-
holding (column 2) and dispersed shareholding (column 3) separately. The parameter
estimate on %Shareholding  Promotersit needs to be interpreted with caution because
widely-held rms have dispersed shareholding by construction. However, interesting dif-
ference that emerges from estimating the models separately for the two types of rms.
Firms with concentrated shareholding and Promoter CEOs invest more in CSR. Export
(as % of sales) is positively and statistically signicantly associated with CSR investments
of widely-held rms. For rms with concentrated shareholding, the parameter estimate
of exports is not statistically signicant at conventional levels, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that consumer preference is a source of heterogeneity in rm preference
for CSR. Export-oriented rms interact with consumers with di¤erent private valuations
for CSR investments and, hence, seem to invest more in CSR. Our results show that the
heterogeneity of rm preference is driven by the ownership structure. Firms with a con-
trolling stakeholder invest more in CSR, irrespective of consumer demand, whereas CSR
investments of widely held rms are driven by consumer preference.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Next we examine whether rms with di¤erent ownership structures choose di¤erent
modes of CSR investments, driven by their objectives for such investments. If legacy
building and longer-term protability are the dominant objectives, rms are likely to
invest more in charitable donations and social infrastructure. Therefore, we estimate
our baseline model with the disaggregated measures of CSR as the dependent variables.
In Table 6, the dependent variables in Columns 1, 2, and 3 are charitable donations,
social and community infrastructure expenses, and environmental and pollution control
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expenses, respectively. All results are for the pooled sample, with year and industry
controls. From Columns 1 and 2, increasing concentration of equity holdings is associated
with higher investments in charitable donations and social and community infrastructure.
The estimate of %Shareholding   Promotersit negative and statistically signicant in
Column3, suggesting that widely held rms invest more in environmental and pollution
control projects. It is di¢ cult to denitively claim that the negative coe¢ cient is driven
by the export-orientation of rms, but some evidence exists that rms with di¤erent
ownership structures di¤er in the modes of CSR investment.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The results presented in Table 5 could be biased. Not all rms in our sample invest
in CSR, and the distribution of CSR spending is skewed. Using a censored dependent
variable is likely to underestimate the parameter estimates. We check for the robustness
of our baseline results using Tobit regressions. However, the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates are likely to be biased only in the censored region. Therefore, we compare
the Tobit results with the OLS estimates for the subsample of rms with nonzero CSR
investments, the results of which are presented in Table 7. In Specication 1, we report
the marginal e¤ects from the Tobit regression with the pooled sample; in Specications 2
and 3, the OLS estimates with the subsample of rms investing in CSR and the full sample
for the sake of comparison. The key variable of interest is %Shareholding Pr omotersit;
the coe¢ cient for which is of similar magnitude across all specications. Therefore, it
does not seem that our baseline results are a¤ected by the choice of estimation technique.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
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5.2 Economic Signicance
Our results have broad economic signicance. If CSR investments were to result in en-
hanced nancial performance, we would expect all rms, irrespective of the ownership
structure, to make them. Similarly, if such investments drive consumerschoice, rms
in a competitive market would su¤er losses for not investing in CSR. Because the rms
incur a short-term cost for socially responsible initiatives with uncertain longer-term re-
sults, rms with more concentrated shareholding and longer planning horizons invest more
in CSR, especially when the consumersdemand for delegated philanthropy is weak. If
private provision of public goods is the second-best outcome to public provision, it is
important to understand the incentives of rms to invest in social capital. Firms with
dispersed shareholding tend to invest in CSR when the consumerspreferences are high.
To quantify, a one standard deviation change in equity ownership of the controlling share-
holders leads to a 4.9% increase in CSR investment. To compare, a one standard deviation
change in ROA leads to a 5.21% increase in CSR investments. For widely held rms, a
one standard deviation in exports leads to a 3.8% change in CSR investments. Hetero-
geneity in rmspreferences over CSR investments and, thus, heterogeneity in terms of
CSR spending seem to be associated with di¤erences in ownership structure. This has
implications, particularly in emerging economies in which public provision is not always
e¢ cient or adequate.
5.3 Endogeneity and Alternate Explanations
The results could su¤er from endogenous selection of shareholding and CSR investments.
For example, rms in certain industries can tend to have overrepresentation of both rms
with concentrated equity ownership and CSR investments. We thus include industry
dummies in our regression models. However, other channels of endogeneity could exist.
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We use propensity score matching to address this concern further. We dene the treatment
group as rms with concentrated share ownership and the control group as widely held
rms, with the di¤erence in CSR investment as the outcome. To compare CSR investment
of rms across the two groups with similar characteristics, we match rms on the following
observables: sales, ROA, Tobins q, exports, and industry and year dummies. The results
are presented in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
The results are presented for subsamples of rms with high (above the 50th percentile)
and low exports. In both the subsamples, the di¤erence in CSR investment of rms with
concentrated shareholding and widely held rms are positive and statistically signicant.
However, the di¤erence in outcomes is much larger in the subsample of rms with low
exports. Firms with concentrated ownership invest more in CSR in comparison with rms
with dispersed holding, notwithstanding consumer preference. Widely held rms respond
to consumer preference to invest in CSR, which can explain the smaller di¤erence in
outcomes for the high exports subsample. This is consistent with our theoretical model
and the regression results.
A more robust way to attenuate endogeneity concerns is to use an exogenous shock
that is correlated with CSR investment, but not with the ownership structure. In this
paper, we use antidumping measures against sample rms initiated by other countries
as an exogenous demand shock. Importing countries impose antidumping measures on a
particular product of a specic rm or on a product produced by all rms from a given
exporting country. Faced with a demand shock, rms have a choice of reconsidering in-
vestment decisions given that an average rm in the sample spends about 3% of sales on
CSR. If the CSR investments of rms with dispersed shareholding are driven primarily by
the supply-chain e¤ect, we expect rms to reduce CSR investments, conditional on hav-
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ing antidumping restrictions imposed on them. We collect data on antidumping measures
against Indian rms from the Global Antidumping Database maintained by the World
Bank. We construct an indicator for antidumping, which is equal to one for all years
when the antidumping penalty is in e¤ect. The sample period contains 67 instances of
antidumping penalties against sample rms, which results in 280 rm-year observations
(6.2% of the total sample).10. In Table 9, we present the results with a lagged indictor
for antidumping penalties.11 Consistent with our hypothesis, we nd that rms with dis-
persed shareholding reduce CSR investments when faced with an antidumping penalty,
but rms with concentrated shareholding do not change theirs signicantly. Firms with
dispersed shareholding, with stronger incentives to maximize short-term prots, reduce
their investment in social capital when faced with a demand shock. This result is consis-
tent with the supply-chain e¤ect hypothesis.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
It is possible that the results we highlight are not related to ownership concentration,
and have alternate explanations. For example, it is possible that institutional sharehold-
ing drives CSR investments (Smith, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). From Table 2,
institutional shareholding is higher in rms with concentrated shareholding compared to
that in rms with dispersed shareholding. Also from Table 3, rms investing in CSR have
higher institutional ownership compared to rms that do not invest in CSR. To attenuate
this concern, in our baseline specications, we control for institutional shareholding. To
test that concentration of equity-ownership and not institutional shareholding that drives
our result, we partition the data for rms with high (>p75) and low (<p25) institutional
10A stronger measure is to use anti-dumping penalties imposed by the United States and the European
Union only. We use this as robustness check. The results are qualitatively similar but are less precise
due to smaller number of observations.
11The correlation coe¢ cient of the lagged anti-dumping measure with %Shareholding   Promotersit
and CSR investment are 0.003 and 0.153, respectively.
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ownership. CSR investments are not signicantly di¤erent between the two groups. We
further test the di¤erences in mean CSR investments of rms within the two ownership
categories by high and low institutional ownership. The di¤erence in CSR investments
are not statistically di¤erent for rms with concentrated shareholding, but rms with
dispersed shareholding invest more in CSR if institutional shareholding is high. These
results indicate that concentration of equity ownership is not merely picking up the e¤ects
of institutional shareholding.
Di¤erences in the product market brand image can be furnished as another alternate
explanation of our results. Firms selling consumer goods, and more visible brands may
invest more in CSR (Servaes and Tamaro, 2013) compared to rms producing interme-
diate goods. If the product category and the ownership structure are correlated, then
our results may not be driven by concentration of equity ownership. In our baseline
specications, we use a set of industry dummies to control for this possibility. Further,
we test the di¤erence in means of CSR investments for rms producing consumer goods,
and rms producing intermediate goods. This di¤erence is not statistically signicant at
conventional levels.12 Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that CSR investments of Indian
rms producing intermediate goods have not been insignicant (e.g. Tata Steel, Reliance
Petrochemicals, etc.). Therefore this does not seem a very plausible alternate explanation
of our results. The tables for alternate explanations are presented as online appendices.
5.4 Robustness checks
We test for the robustness of our baseline results. First, we investigate if a rms binary
choice of investing in CSR is associated with the ownership structure. We present the
results from logistic regressions in Appendix D, where the dependent variable is an indi-
12The classication of rms into these two product categories is not an exact science. Firms can
produce in both of these categories. In our classication, we use the main product of the rm as reported
in Prowess.
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cator equal to one if a rm chose to invest in CSR. It seems that the ownership structure,
as measured by the promoters shareholding, and the presence of a promoter CEO are
positively associated with the choice of investing in CSR. This complements our baseline
results.
Next, we examine if di¤erences exist in a rms investment in the three disaggre-
gated measures of CSR. From Appendix E, the association of promoter shareholding with
donation is much stronger for rms with concentrated shareholding. For dispersed share-
holding rms, the association of exports with environmental and pollution expenses is
stronger. Once again, these results support our central hypothesis. Finally, we use alter-
nate classication algorithms of concentrated shareholding: 20% and 15% shareholding of
promoter(s) as the threshold. The results are robust to all these checks. In the interests
of brevity, the tables are not presented here.
6 Conclusion
Firms make a strategic choice to invest in CSR. The choice depends not only on consumer
preference, but also on rm-specic characteristics. In this paper, we model a rms choice
of investing in CSR conditional on the ownership structure. In equilibrium, rms with
dispersed shareholding invest in CSR only in reaction to consumer preference and rms
with concentrated shareholding invest in CSR notwithstanding consumerschoice. The
concentration of holdings, often in the hands of a family, strongly aligns the interests of
the rm and the shareholders and also allows the shareholders to have a longer planning
horizon. Using information from listed rms in India, where both types of rms are
found within the same legislative environment, we provide empirical evidence in favor
of our theoretical predictions. This is the rst paper to incorporate heterogeneous rm
preference for CSR investments. At the same time, it is important to highlight what our
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paper does not do. We do not seek to establish that one type of ownership structure
is associated with more altruism than the other. We merely investigate the incentives
for rms to invest in social capital and how ownership structure is associated with such
incentives. We also do not comment on the welfare implications of heterogeneous rm
preference for CSR investment. Besley and Ghatak (2007) show the welfare implications
of private provision of public good and nd that private provision is the second-best
outcome to public provision. Within that premise, this paper shows that rms di¤er in
their preference for CSR investments and that private provision of public goods depends
on both rm and consumer preference for CSR.
Our results are robust to rm and industry characteristics and does not seem to be
susceptible to endogeneity concerns. The association of CSR investments with ownership
structure is important because the rationales for such investments are not fully under-
stood. No conclusive evidence suggests that CSR investments enhance rm performance.
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Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the
empirical analysis. All monetary values are in constant 2010 US$.
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 5311 0.083 0.1110 -0.847 1.826
MTBV 5311 1.419 2.917 0.187 13.521
EPS 5311 0.547 8.373 -5.740 550.34
Sales (/1,000) 5311 522.592 2229.181 0.011 68215.143
Total Assets (/1,000) 5311 77.121 264.824 .210 6332.593
Exports/Sales (%) 5311 22.538 42.663 0.00 93.51
%Shareholding-Promoters 5311 41.577 20.847 0.000 88.911
%Shareholding-Institutions 4395 17.806 14.4962 0.000 88.194
Promoter CEO 5311 0.375 0.484 0.000 1.000
Board Size 5311 9.949 3.328 4.000 33.000
% Outside Directors 5311 51.799 16.181 48.330 93.500
CSR 3762 15.061 38.722 0.000 2880.000
Donations 3762 13.044 86.515 0.000 2880.000
Social and Community Expenses 3762 0.487 8.046 0.000 327.500




Comparison of Firms with Concentrated and Dispersed Shareholding
We compare performance, size, board characteristics, and CSR investments of rms with conce-
ntrated and dispersed shareholding structures. Firms with concentrated shareholding on average,
are larger, make more in charitable donations, invest more in social and community issues, but
spend less for environmental and pollution control. No statistically signicant di¤erence exists in
rm performance and board characteristics. All variables are winsorized at 1% levels. * indicates
that the di¤erence is statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Variables Firms with Concentrated Firms with Dispersed
Shareholding Shareholding Di¤erence
%Shareholding-Institutions 19.652 15.967 3.685*
ROA 0.080 0.089 -0.009
MTBV 1.510 1.488 0.022
EPS 0.462 0.605 -0.143
Sales (/1,000) 697.781 404.465 293.316*
Total Assets (/1,000) 114.964 51.611 63.353*
Export/Sales (%) 20.781 23.723 -2.942
Board Size 10.137 9.195 0.222
% Outside Directors 51.020 51.764 -0.744
CSR 20.441 11.248 9.193*
Donations 19.180 8.675 10.505*
Social and Community Exp 0.664 0.360 0.304*




Comparisons of Firms with and without CSR Investment
This table compares rm-years with no CSR investment and rm-
years with non-zero CSR investment. Larger and more protable
rms invest more in CSR. All variables are winsorized at 1% levels.
* indicates that the di¤erence is statistically signicant at conventi-
-onal levels.
Variables Mean-No Mean- Di¤erence
CSR CSR
Return on Assets 0.080 0.086 -0.006
MTBV 1.545 1.763 -0.218
EPS 0.513 0.558 -0.045
Sales (/1,000) 667.104 650.722 16.372
Total Assets (/1,000) 91.030 68.940 22.09*
%Shareholding-Promoters 19.551 49.854 -30.303*
%Shareholding-Institutions 16.705 18.518 -1.813*
Exports/Sales (%) 17.660 21.924 -4.264*
Board Size 9.548 10.210 -0.662
% Non-Executive 50.656 50.892 -0.236
Table 4
Comparison of Actual and Imputed CSR
This table compares imputed and actual CSR of rms with dispersed
shareholding. The di¤erence of imputed and actual CSR is statistically
signicant. This suggests that rms with dispersed shareholding would
invest more in CSR, if it were a rm with concentrated shareholding
in the same industry. * indicates that the di¤erence is statistically
signicant at conventional levels.
Variables Imputed Actual Di¤erence
CSR-Dispersed CSR-Dispersed
Sales-Multiplier 18.30 11.28 7.02*
Asset-Multuplier 19.04 11.28 7.76*
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Table 5
Ownership Structure and Investment in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
In this table, we present the baseline results. The dependent variable is ln(CSR).
All monetary values are winsorized at 1%. The main variable of interest is
%Shareholding   Promotersit:which is positively associated with the dependent
variables in all specications. . ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%,.5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ln(CSR)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full Sample Concentrated Dispersed Holding
Shareholding
% Shareholding-Promoters it 0.051** 0.064** 0.002
(0.023) (0.017) (0.002)
Sales 0.486*** 0.519*** 0.419***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.037)
ROA 0.390*** 0.472*** 0.392***
(0.045) (0.069) (0.82)
Board Size 0.087*** 0.075*** 0.084***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.019)
% Independent Directors 0.001 -0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Promoter CEO 0.024 0.118** -0.060
(0.037) (0.047) (0.102)
%Shareholding-Institutions 0.017 0.019 0.013*
(0.013) (0.016) (0.006)
Export / Sales (%) 0.002* -0.004 0.007***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.413*** -3.049** -3.413
(0.299) (0.433) (0.401)
Observations 3,762 1,582 2,180
Adjusted-R2 0.314 0.307 0.285
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Table 6
Ownership Structure and Spend on Di¤erent CSR Initiatives
In this table we present the results for di¤erent measures of CSR investments. The dependent
variable is mentioned at the top of each column. All monetary values are winsorized.at 1%.
The main variable of interest is % Shareholding-Promoters. This is positively associated with
with the dependent variables in all specications. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%, 5
%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable
Variables Donation Social and Community Environmental/Pollution
Expenses Control Expenses
% Shareholding-Promoters it 0.634*** 0.212*** -0.0488**
(0.220) (0.077) (0.022)
Sales 0.516*** 0.122** -0.000
(0.018) (0.013) (0.000)
ROA 0.559*** 0.250*** 0.242*
(0.152) (0.103) (0.127)
Board Size 0.113*** 0.018** 0.065**
(0.043) (0.0.008) (0.030)
% Independent Directors -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Promoter CEO 0.058* 0.033 -0.017
(0.030) (0.019) (0.025)
% Shareholding-Institutions 0.098 0.000 0.008
(0.210) (0.002) (0.007)
Export / Sales (%) -0.008 -0.013 0.020***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.520*** -0.848*** -1.730**
(0.304) (0.094) (0.924)
Observations 3,762 3,762 3,762
Adjusted-R2 0.310 0.187 0.172
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Table 7
Ownership Structure and CSR Controlling for Bias
In this table we present the results with di¤erent approaches to control for
bias induced by rms which do not invest in CSR. In column (1) we estimat
-e a Tobit model, in column (2) we estimate a OLS model for rms that inv
-est in CSR, and column (3) presents the OLS estimates with the full samp





Variables Non-Zero CSR Full sample
% Shareholding-Promoters it 0.086** 0.074** 0.051**
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023)
Sales 0.535*** 0.511*** 0.486***
(0.029) (0.018) (0.035)
ROA 0.441*** 0.426*** 0.390***
(0.140) (0.052) (0.045)
Board Size 0.067*** 0.066** 0.087***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.013)
% Independent Directors 0.009 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Promoter CEO 0.049 0.031 0.024
(0.033) (0.024) (0.037)
% Shareholding-Institutions 0.023 0.017 0.017
(0.016) (0.011) (0.013)
Export / Sales (%) 0.003** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes




Propensity Score Matching Models
We match concentrated shareholding rms in our sample with dispersed shareholding rms
using nearest neighbourhood (Panel A), radius=0.1 (Panel B), Gaussian kernel (Panel C),
and Mahalanobis (Panel D) matching methods. The variables used in the matching are rm
size, rm performance, market-to-book, ratio, exports, industry and year dummies. Firms
are divided into sub-samples of high and low export as percentage of sales. The average
treatment to the treated is higher is consistently higher for the subsample for the low export
sub-sample. This suggests that the di¤erence in CSR between rms with concentrated and
dispersed shareholding can be partially attributed to consumer preference. ***, **, and **
denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Di¤erence in CSR between rms with
concentrated and dispersed shareholdings
Subsample of rms Subsample of rms
with high exports with low exports
Panel A: Nearest Neighborhood Match
Average Treatment to Treated 3.42** 10.19**
No. of Observations 2289 2197
Panel B: Radius Match (0.1)
Average Treatment to Treated 15.27** 18.60**
No. of Observations 2210 2053
Panel C: Kernel Matching
Average Treatment to Treated 9.72** 15.71**
No. of Observations 2289 2197
Panel D: Mahalanobis Distance Matching
Average Treatment to Treated 9.20** 15.08*




In this table we present the results of the impact on CSR of antidumping
penalty imposed on rms. The main variable of interest is Anti-Dumping it 1,
a lagged indicator for antidumping penalty. The indicator is negatively ass-
ociated with CSR investment, specially for rms with dispersed share-holdi




Full Sample Concentrated Dispersed
Variables






% Shareholding-Promoters it 0.064** 0.003
(0.017) (0.002)
Sales 0.311*** 0.519*** 0.281***
(0.025) (0.042) (0.037)
ROA 0.296*** 0.472*** 0.194***
(0.011) (0.069) (0.082)
Board Size 0.087*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.019)
% Independent Directors 0.001 -0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Promoter CEO 0.024 0.118** -0.060
(0.037) (0.047) (0.102)
% Shareholding-Institutions 0.017 0.019 0.013*
(0.013) (0.016) (0.006)
Export / Sales (%) 0.002* -0.004 0.007***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.417*** -50.99** -53.28***
(0.2999) (19.41) (17.19)
Observations 3,762 3,762 3,762
Adjusted-R2 0.314 0.307 0.311
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Appendix A.
CSR can be treated as variable costs: for each unit sold, i is donated to a social
cause. The total amount spent on CSR is therefore given by iqi and rm is objective
function is:
Ui = (pi   c  i)qi + iiqi (12)
A1. Consumers are not willing to pay for CSR .
In stage 2, given their CSR characteristics, rms will set their prices in order to
maximise their objective function (12), with demand functions given by (2) and (3) and
subject to the constraint that pi   c  i, i.e. the amount given to the charity cannot
exceed the rms mark-up.
Due to this constraint on the level of prices, corner solutions in stage 2 can be ruled
out. Consider, for example rm 0. At the corner solution q0 = 0, rm 0 gets a zero payo¤.
The condition to have q0 = 0 is that p0 > p1 + t, with p0 > c + 0 and p1 > c + 1.
Therefore, by choosing a su¢ ciently low level of CSR in stage 1, rm 0 can easily avoid
corner solutions in stage 2 and enjoy a positive payo¤. The same reasoning applies for
rm 1.
Assuming positive demands for both rms, rst-order conditions will lead to the fol-
lowing prices:







p1 = t+ c+
2
3
(1  1)1 + 1
3
0
With these prices, rm 1s prot will cover its CSR expenditures if (1   0) < 3t  
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21.13
If this condition is not satised, rm 1 is constrained to set a price equal to p1 = c+1.
The price set by rm 0 is then given by p0 = c+ t+1+02 .
































if 1   0  3t  21
1
4t
[3t+ 0   1] if (1   0) > 3t  21
(14)
In stage 1, whatever the CSR characteristics (0; 1), the utility of rm 0, U0 is de-
creasing in 0. Indeed, neither consumers nor rm 0 care about CSR. As a consequence,
the best response of rm 0 will be to choose 0 = 0. By contrast, the rm with concen-
trated ownership cares about CSR. For 1   0  3t   21 or equivalently 1 < 3t2+1 ,
U1 is strictly increasing in 1 and convex. For higher levels of CSR, U1 is concave and
reaches a maximum at 1 = 3t2 .
The intuition is as follows: as long as 1 is su¢ ciently small, rm 1 is able to increase
its payo¤ by reducing the price (and still earning a mark-up higher than the cost of CSR)
and increasing the quantity sold. For higher levels of CSR, the mark-up will be exactly
equal to the cost of CSR, which implies that increasing 1 has two e¤ects: it increases
directly the utility derived from CSR and it induces an increase in price, which reduces the
quantity sold and decrease both prots and utility derived from CSR. These two e¤ects
balance each other at 1 = 3t2 .
As a consequence, when consumers are not willing to pay for CSR and CSR is char-
13The condition for rm 0 is similar to the condition for an interior solution and so is automatically
satised.
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p1 = t+ 1 = c+
3t
2




If rm 1 would leave the price unchanged compared to the situation without CSR (in
which rms share the market equally and prices are given by t+ c), rm 1 has increased
its price in order to be able to commit to a higher level of CSR (3t
2
rather than t). Note
that the total amount of CSR (1q1) is higher than when keeping the price at t + c and
devoting the entire prot to CSR spending.
A2. Consumers are willing to pay for CSR .
In stage 2, given their CSR characteristics, rms will set their prices in order to
maximise their objective function (12), with demand functions given by (2) and (3) and
subject to the constraint that pi   c  i.
Using the same type of argument as for the case where  = 0, we can readily show
that at the equilibrium of the two-stage game, both rms sell a positive quantity.
Assuming positive demand for both rms, rst-order conditions will lead to the fol-
lowing prices:
p0 = c+ t+










   2 + 2
3
1
With these prices, rm 1s prot will cover its CSR expenditures if (1  )(1  0) 
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(0   1) + 0 + 1
2
p1 = c+ 1




































if (1  )(1   0)  3t  21
1
4t
[3t+ (1  )(0   1)] if (1  )(1   0) > 3t  21
(16)
Depending on the intensity of consumerspreferences, two cases can be distinguished:
Case 1:  < 1
This case is very similar to the case where  = 0: U0 is strictly decreasing in 0, while
U1 is rst increasing in 1 and then decreasing in 1. Therefore the equilibrium of the
two-stage game will be:
0 = 0 And 1 =
3t
2(1  )







p1 = c+ 1 = c+
3t
2




Case 2:   1
In this case, each rms payo¤ is increasing in the di¤erence i   j. Firms will thus
try to overtake the CSR investment of the other rm. In the end, both rms will invest

















 if   3t
2
c+  if  > 3t
2
(18)































if  > 3t
2
(20)
It is worth noting that when consumerswillingness to pay for CSR is relatively small
(i.e.  < 1), the level of CSR chosen by rm 1 does not depend on its preferences for
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CSR (). By contrast, when consumerswillingness to pay is su¢ ciently high, the total
amount of CSR 1q1 will depend on rm 1s preferences over CSR.
As for the case where CSR is characterized by xed costs, when the consumerswill-
ingness to pay for CSR is low, only the rm with concentrated ownership will invest in
CSR and the amount invested is xed (i.e. does not depend on ). By contrast, when
the consumerswillingness to pay is su¢ ciently high, the total amount chosen by the rm
with concentrated ownership is greater than the amount chosen by the rm with dispersed
shareholding and this total amount increases with .
The performance in terms of prots depends on the consumers behavior. If the
willingness to pay for CSR is low, the rm with a dispersed shareholding has a higher
prot: as consumers do not care su¢ ciently about CSR, they will not necessarily buy more
from the rm with concentrated shareholding. Therefore, to increase the total amount of
CSR, this rm will increase its price in order to be able to choose a very 1. This choice
reduces the market share of the rm with concentrated ownership.
If the willingness to pay for CSR is high, the rm with dispersed shareholding may
have a higher or a lower prot than the rm with concentrated shareholding. Both rms
choose the same i, but the rm with concentrated will charge a lower price in order to
increase its market share and be able to invest more in CSR activities.
Appendix B







where I(CSR) = The imputed CSR of a rm i with concentrated shareholding as dis-
persed shareholding rms
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)mf = The multiple of CSR to an accounting item (sales or assets) for the
median rm with dispersed shareholding in rm i0s industry.
For example, to calculate using sales as the accounting item, we multiply the industry
median CSR- to-sales ratio for the dispersed shareholding rms in rm its industry by rm
its sales. The product is the imputed value of the CSR for rm i using a sales-multiplier.




This table presents the description of key variables used in the empirical
analysis.
Variables Description
ROA Net Prot/Total Assets
MTBV Tobins Q approximated as market to book value
EPS NetIncome Dividends
AverageOuts tan dingShares
Sales (/1,000) Total Annual Sales in 000 US$
Total Assets (/1,000) Total Assets in 000 US$
Exports/Sales (%) Ratio of Exports over Total Annual Sales
%Shareholding-Promoters Equity ownership of controlling stakeholders,
both direct and indirect holdings.
%Shareholding-Institutions Equity ownership of nancial institutions, public
sector holdings, etc.
Promoter CEO =1 if CEO has controlling stakeholding, either
individually, or as a family.
Board Size Number of Directors on the board
% Outside Directors NumberofIndependent Directors
BoardSi ze
*100
CSR Annual spend in CSR, in million US$
Donations Donations to charitable causes, but excluding
political donations, in 000 US$
Social and Community Expenses Investment in social infrastructure like
parks, schools, etc. in 000 US$
Environment and Pollution Investment in environmentally sustainable
Control Expenses practices, in 000 US$.
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Appendix D: Probability of Investing in CSR
In this table we present the likelihood of rms investing in CSR. In columns
2 and 3 we present the estimates for rms with concentrated and dispers-
ed shareholding respectively. Concentration of equity holding is positively
associated with CSR investment. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full Sample Concentrated Dispersed
Shareholding Shareholding
% Shareholding-Promoters 0.002** 0.005** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Sales 0.016 0.008 0.018
(0.014) (0.021) (0.020)
ROA 0.082 0.502 0.088
(0.208) (0.388) (0.271)
Board Size 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.012
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
% Independent Directors 0.002* -0.005** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
% Shareholding-Institutions 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Promoter CEO 0.269*** 0.279*** 0.243***
(0.040) (0.065) (0.053)
Export / Sales (%) -0.000* -0.003 0.005**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.087*** -1.492*** -0.690***
(0.201) (0.352) (0.264)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Robustness to alternate explanations
This table compares CSR investment for rms with high (>p75)
and low (<p25) institutional ownership (Panel A), and for rms
producing consumer goods and intermediate goods (Panel B).
None of the di¤erences are statistically signicant at conventi-
-onal levels.
Panel A %Shareholding- %Shareholding- Di¤erence
Institutions <p25 Institutions >p75
CSR 14.660 15.224 -0.564
Panel B Consumer Intermediate Di¤erence
Products Products
CSR 15.189 14.940 0.249
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